What are the effects of providing assistance to intact families when the principal earner is unemployed and denying it when s/he is employed? The existing literature suggests that this practice has strong work-disincentive effects and favors persistent unemployment and welfare dependency. In this paper we reassess this thesis using new US experimental data. Our findings differ from predictions based on survey data and simulations. Targeting assistance to families with an unemployed principal earner has only very limited disincentive impacts on families' work effort and actually lowers the welfare caseload.
Introduction
From the early sixties to the late nineties, Aid to Families with Dependent ChildrenUnemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) was the main cash transfer program for assistance to children in two-parent families in the U.S.. One of the basic eligibility requirements distinguishing this program from aid to single-parent families (AFDC-FG) was that the principal earner 3 had to be unemployed, meaning s/he was restricted to work no more than 100 hours per month while receiving benefits. In 1996, AFDC was replaced nationwide by
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) which was created by the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act and became effective July 1997. Under TANF, there are no specific provisions limiting the inclusion of low-income families. In particular, the principal earner is no longer required to be unemployed. Eligibility criteria differ greatly across states; 33 states have only a low-income test and no other requirements for eligibility;
10 states have an income test and an unemployment requirement for applicants, and 8 also for recipients. For instance, TANF in California still has the unemployment rule (100-hour rule)
for applicants, but not for recipients.
The variations in eligibility criteria across states stem from the debate whether assistance to intact families should be provided only when the principal earner is unemployed or whether all intact families among the low-income population should be aided, regardless of the principal earner's work status. The basic argument in favor of helping families only when parents are unemployed is that this restriction reduces the potential welfare caseload. The argument against this practice is that it creates work-disincentive effects that favor persistent unemployment, welfare dependency and ultimately increase both the welfare caseload and the unemployment rate.
The debate on welfare policy and unemployment is intense also in Europe, where the primary objective of many new proposals for welfare reform is to increase the work effort of welfare recipients. To make useful policy recommendations one would need to know the actual workdisincentive effects of targeting assistance to families with unemployed-parents. In this paper we address this issue using experimental data collected in California between 1992 and 1994.
The experimental treatment is precisely a waiver of the unemployment requirement (the 100-hour rule) in the continuing eligibility criteria for AFDC-UP. To our knowledge, this is the first experimental evaluation testing specifically the effect of this work limitation among intact families on aid in the U.S. 4 . Our results differ from previous findings obtained from survey data and parametric models and therefore have different policy implications.
A reassessment using experimental data
While they are many studies exploring the impact of welfare on the incentive to work for single-parents, there are few such studies on two parent families 5 . In particular, the effects of programs that give priority to intact families with unemployed principal earners have scarcely been studied by the economic literature.
One important exception is Hoynes (1996) . Hoynes develops a model of labor supply in which hours of work are chosen to maximize family utility subject to a budget constraint that accounts for benefits from the Aid to Families with Dependent Children-Unemployed Parent (AFDC-UP) program 6 . Using data from the 1984 Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP), Hoynes provides maximum-likelihood estimates for the underlying hours of work and welfare equations. These estimates make it possible to determine the work disincentive effects of AFDC-UP benefits and eligibility rules. The estimated disincentive effects turn out to be very strong. More specifically, Hoynes finds that the practice of targeting assistance to children in families with unemployed principal earners does not reduce the welfare caseload, though it contributes substantially to the persistence of unemployment and low work-effort among the low-income population.
Hoynes' estimations suggest that the work disincentive effects of welfare transfers in twoparent families are much greater than those found in the existing literature on female-headed families. Hoynes' explanation is that parents in intact families have higher potential wages and greater labor market opportunities than single parents. These differences between two-parent and single-parent families translate into higher behavioral responses among two-parent 4 In contrast, there is a large literature concerned with estimating the effects of unearned income on labor supply using experimental data. See for instance Rees (1974) , Hausman and Wise (1977) , Watts et al (1974) and, more recently, Card and Robbins (1996) , and Imbens, Rubin and Sacerdote (1999) . 5 The literature on work incentives and the U.S. welfare system dates back to the debates on negative income tax in the mid-sixties (see for instance Lampman, 1965) . In general, studies on two-parent families have found significant, but modest effects of transfers on labor supply and welfare participation. See Moffitt (1992) , Dantziger, Haveman and Plotnick (1981) and Burtless (1989) . 6 Hosek (1980) also provides a description of participation in the AFDC-UP program.
families. Hoynes' arguments are in line with the growing empirical literature on family labor supply that suggests unequivocally that families are sensitive to changes in tax and benefit structures 7 .
In this paper we report and analyze the results of a random experiment in which the experimental treatment is a waiver of the unemployment requirement in the continuing eligibility criteria for AFDC-UP. This experiment was conducted in California between 1992 and 1994. We examine whether the waiver affects welfare participation, employment and earnings and whether these experimental effects differ by family size. Given that family needs vary with the number of children, large and small families may respond very differently to a given modification of the eligibility rules. When we focus on large families (5 children or more) we find a positive impact on earnings and employment rates, a negative effect on AFDC grants, and no significant impact on welfare participation. These results are in line with policy-makers' expectations. They suggest that some large families are constrained by the 100-hour rule and trapped in a low-employment situation. They would respond to a waiver of the 100-hour rule by increasing their work effort. This is the basic work incentive effect of the waiver.
In contrast, when we focus on families with less than 5 children (i.e., 85% of the families), we find a significant increase in AFDC grants and welfare participation among families in the experiment group (a 30% increase two years after entry into the experiment), but no significant effect on their employment rates and earned income. These impacts differ from policy-makers' expectations, and from previous predictions based on simulations. They suggest that a significant proportion of small and middle-sized families whose principalearners are employed have such low earnings that their income remains below the welfare eligibility threshold. In the absence of the unemployment restriction, these families would remain on welfare. This is the basic "eligibility" effect of the waiver. Given that the vast majority of families have less than 5 children, the most significant net effect of waiving the unemployment restriction is actually to increase welfare participation.
As far as we know, our paper is the first to report such results and to develop their economic interpretation 8 . Our paper identifies effects that have not been identified until now because it introduces a new dimension -family size -that has not been examined previously. Family size is crucial for the analysis of incentives to work while on welfare because both family needs and maximum welfare benefits vary by family size. Our paper also introduces a methodological innovation, as it does not simply examine the impact of the waiver on the means of the different outcomes, but on the entire distribution of each of the different outcomes. This approach makes it possible to identify (and test the significance of) differences that have not been examined until now.
The simplest explanation for the differences between our results and results from studies based on simulations is that studies based on survey data make optimistic assumptions about the potential wages of unemployed parents in two-parent families. Another explanation is that most existing studies neglect the (potentially negative) correlation between preference for non-work hours and potential wages. The higher this correlation, the more hazardous it is to rely on existing simulations to predict the incentive effects of welfare programs. An additional explanation is that non-experimental results are based on national samples while our experiment takes place in a specific geographic area, where the incentive to work may happen to be particularly weak.
The basic advantage of experimental data remains, however, that we do not have to make specific assumptions about the distribution of potential wages or about the joint distribution of potential wages and preferences. A supplementary advantage of our specific experiment is that it manipulated only one specific eligibility rule. Most other demonstration projects combine several treatments simultaneously, so that the evaluation of the effect of any particular waiver is difficult 9 .
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief description of the eligibility rules and benefits corresponding to the AFDC-UP program. Section 3 presents our randomized experiment and the theoretical framework used for interpreting its results. Section 4 reports the empirical results and Section 5 proposes some interpretations of our findings and of the differences between our experimental results and previous findings. The last section concludes.
2 AFDC-UP: background, eligibility rules and benefits.
In this paper, we analyze the impact of a modification in the eligibility requirements for the income and asset levels. Furthermore, at least one parent must display significant attachment to the labor market (meaning typically that s/he was eligible for unemployment compensation in the last year) and this parent (defined the principal earner) is restricted to work no more than 100 hours per month while receiving benefits. By imposing the 100-hour work limit, the AFDC-UP program targets assistance to children with unemployed parents.
Family benefits are calculated as the difference between the maximum benefit level and net family income. Maximum benefit varies by family size. In 1992, the maximum benefits in California were 293 dollars for a family with one child, 490 dollars for two children, 607 dollars for three children, 723 dollars for four children, and then about 90 additional dollars for each supplementary child (until the tenth). Net family income includes all unearned income plus earned income. A standard deduction of 30 dollars for work expenses is deducted from earnings in calculating benefit payments. During the first four months of working while on AFDC, one third of earnings is also deductible: for every 1 dollar increase in earned income benefits are reduced by 67 cents. After four months, the benefits are reduced one-toone with an increase in earning. Thus, the implicit tax rate on earned income for AFDC-UP recipients lies between 67% and 100%. The implicit tax and the maximum benefit level define an income threshold at which point benefits are zero. Below the threshold the household can receive positive benefits and above the point the household is no longer eligible for aid. This threshold varies by family size, as the maximum benefit level differs by family size.
The Experiment and its Theoretical Impact
To identify the effect of eliminating the 100-hour work limit, we use data from a randomized experiment (LINK-UP Demonstration Project) conducted between January 1 1992, and
December 31 1994, in seven Californian counties 10 . With greater acceptance of the idea that combining welfare with work is an important step toward self-sufficiency, policy makers and program managers began to question the rationale behind limiting work activity while on aid.
The LINK-UP project was a response to solicitation of demonstration projects, under the Family Support Act of 1988, to test and evaluate different definitions of unemployment (for details on the history of the 100-hour rule see Hasenfeld et al 1995) . The primary aim of waiving the 100-hour rule was to ''require principal wage earners in the AFDC-U Program to accept any offer of employment, or increase the hours of their current employment, without losing eligibility for aid, until the amount of their net non-exempt earned income matches the size of the AFDC-U grant they would otherwise receive'' (LINK-UP Request for Proposal 1990). To test the impact of the 100-hour rule waiver, AFDC-UP recipients were randomly assigned to experiment and control groups. Those in the experiment group had the 100-hour rule waived. Once cases were assigned to either group, they remained in that group even if they left aid and later returned.
More specifically, we use a sample of 3238 families with random assignment of 1/4 to the control group and 3/4 to the experiment group. In the control group, the 100-hour restriction is maintained for continuing AFDC-UP eligibility. In the experiment group, the 100-hour restriction is eliminated 11 . The sample is representative of the 1992 AFDC-UP caseload (cases on AFDC-UP at least one month during 1992) in these counties. The families are followed for a full 24 months. More details are provided in the data appendix.
In the next section, we provide a simple theoretical analysis of the potential impacts of an experimental waiver of the restriction on hours for continuing eligibility for welfare participation 12 . This theoretical discussion provides the guideline for our empirical investigation.
Theoretical impact of the waiver
From a theoretical viewpoint, the waiver of the 100-hour rule may have two types of effects, as shown in the basic leisure-income graph in Figure 1 .
The first effect concerns families that would have remained on welfare in the absence of the waiver. Because of the waiver, some of these families may increase their work effort and exit unemployment without losing welfare eligibility. These families were trapped in a lowemployment situation before the waiver. This is the basic "work-incentive" effect of the waiver: more work, same welfare caseload (Figure 1 , arrow A). The second possible effect concerns families that would have exited unemployment and welfare in the absence of the waiver. Because of the waiver, some of these families may remain eligible for welfare in spite of their primary earners' exiting unemployment. This impact corresponds to the basic "eligibility" effect of the waiver: more welfare, not more work effort (arrows B and C).
Within this framework, what differences should we observe between families in the experiment and control groups after the waiver of the rule and how should we interpret these differences?
First, we may observe higher employment rates and earned income within the experiment group, but no differences in welfare participation between the experiment and control groups.
Such differences and similarities between control and experiment groups correspond to the case where a significant proportion of families in the control group are still on welfare after the waiver, and are actually constrained by the unemployment requirement. They would work 11 The unemployment standard is retained for establishing initial eligibility for AFDC-U. The 100-hour rule is waived for the experiment group only for continuing eligibility determination 12 A possible formal treatment is provided in Lewin and Maurin (2000) .
and earn more in the absence of this limitation. The impact of the waiver on these families is represented by arrow A in the basic labor-leisure graph depicted in Figure 1 . This is the "work incentive" effect of the waiver, the very effect that policy-makers expected. In such a case, the differences in employment rates provide us with an estimate of the work incentive effects, i.e.
an estimate of the proportion of families trapped in a low-employment situation by the 100-hour rule.
Another possibility is that we observe more welfare participation within the experiment group but no differences in employment rates across experiment and control groups. Such differences and similarities correspond to the case where a significant proportion of families in the control group are off welfare, their principal earner is employed but their income is still lower than the AFDC-UP eligibility threshold. In the absence of the unemployment constraint, these families would still be eligible for welfare, in spite of their principal-earners'
employment. In such a case, the difference in welfare participation across experiment and control groups provides us with an estimate of the "eligibility" effect, i.e. an estimate of the proportion of very low income families exiting aid due to employment, but not earnings.
Notice that when they are in the experiment group these working poor families may work less than they would have worked if they have been obliged to exit welfare 13 . Generally speaking, the number of hours worked and the principal earners' earned income may be either the same (Figure 1 , arrow B) or slightly less (arrow C) in the experiment group than in the control group, depending on the relative preferences for non-work hours.
To estimate the magnitude of these "eligibility" and "work-incentive" effects, we need to examine jointly the differences in earnings, employment rates and welfare participation between families in the experiment and control groups. Given that family needs vary with the number of children, we need to perform these comparisons separately by family size. As shown earlier, AFDC benefits increase with family size but there is no reason to assume that these benefits have the same economic significance and the same "work disincentive" effects on a small family as on a large family. If the increase in AFDC benefits does not fully compensate for the increase in family needs, we may find different work-incentive effects for large and small families.
Results
In this section, we examine the differences in welfare participation and labor market outcomes across the experiment and control groups. As stated in the previous section, the results for these comparisons provide a simple method for identifying and interpreting the impact of providing assistance to two-parent families when the principal earner is unemployed and denying it when s/he is employed.
Welfare Participation
First, we set out to test whether waiving the 100-hour rule has an effect on welfare participation measured as percent of cases on AFDC-UP. Table 1 shows that the percent of cases on AFDC-UP decreases as the experiment proceeds, and cases in the control group exit AFDC at a faster rate than cases in the experiment group. The difference in the percent of cases on aid becomes particularly important in the second year of the experiment. Two years after entry (Q8), the welfare participation rate is 22% higher in the experiment group than in the control group (.45 vs. .37). Interestingly, the difference is more pronounced for small (27%) and middle-sized families (24%) than for large families (10%). Moreover, for large families, the difference in welfare participation between experiment and control groups is not statistically significant.
These results have two implications. The first is that the exogenous determinants for welfare participation (non-earned income, potential wages, preferences) change from one period to the next, which is expected. Otherwise families in the control group would all remain on welfare and we would not observe any difference in welfare participation across the experiment and control groups after the waiver. The second basic implication is that there is a significant proportion of small and middle-sized families (about 25%) who exit welfare due to employment, but not earnings. In the absence of the unemployment restriction, they would remain eligible to participate in the welfare program (again see Figure 1 , arrows B and C).
From a theoretical viewpoint, this is the only possible reason for observing differences in welfare participation across the experiment and control groups after 1992
Primary-earner earned income, employment and hours
To test whether the waiver affects primary-earners' employment and earnings, and whether these effects differ by family size, we begin by comparing mean earnings by control and experiment, controlling for family size. Table 2 shows that among small and middle sized families there are no statistically significant differences between the control and experiment groups throughout the two-year period, In contrast, the experiment has a positive impact on mean earnings among large families (statistically significant at the 6% level). For large families, the mean wage of primary-wage earners in the experiment group is about 50% higher than in the control group, which corresponds to an average increase of about 1,275 dollars in a two-year period.
Differences in means are sometimes of borderline statistical significance, possibly due to the high variance in earnings within groups. Therefore, we conducted Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) tests 14 to test for differences in the distributions of primary-earners' earned incomes between control and experiment groups, by family size. The results regarding the distribution of earned income substantiate the results for differences in means. The KS statistic shows that the differences in the distribution of earned income of families in the control and experiment groups are statistically insignificant among small and middle-sized families 15 , and statistically significant among large families (at the 2% level). These findings suggest that the effect of waiving the 100-hour rule on earned income differs by family size. Although the waiver has little effect among small and middle-sized families, it increases earned income among large families.
Next, we tested whether the waiver has an impact on the employment rate. Table 3 confirms the findings regarding earned income and shows that the waiver has a negligible impact among small families, a small and negative impact among middle-sized families, and a large and positive impact among large families. Among large families, the employment rate is, on average, 50% higher in the experiment group than in the control group, in each quarter.
14 Let F E (F C ) be the observed distribution function of income for experiment (control) families and let N E (N C ) be the size of the sample of experiment (control) families. The Kolmogorov statistics (KS) is the most extreme value of the absolute difference between the two distribution functions, i.e. max [abs(F E (x)-F C (x))]. The equality between the two distribution is rejected at the 1% (5%) level when the KS statistics is greater than a threshold that can be written C 1% =1.63 15 Notice, however, that the differences in the distribution of earnings for middle-sized families are near statistical significance (p=.11 for year 1 and p=.2 for year 2). This suggests that the earnings of some of these families may have been significantly affected. The number of impacted families would be too modest, however, for this impact to translate into significant differences in averages.
These simple comparisons demonstrate that waiving the 100-hour rule for AFDC-U families has little or no effect on the work behavior of primary earners in small and middle-sized families, but substantially increases the work effort and earnings of primary-earners in large families.
Our data also provide us with two proxies of hours worked while on aid. Unfortunately, the information on hours worked is less reliable than the information on welfare and earnings used in this study. Information on hours worked while on welfare is either self-reported and available only on a cumulative basis, or inferred from earnings reported by employer, and calculated based on assumptions regarding wage rate, and consistent monthly employment during a quarter.
For small and middle-sized families we find very few differences between experiment and control groups. For large families, we find that the share of large families on welfare and principal-earner working less than 100 hours is 15% higher in the experiment group than in the control group. This increase in hours worked is consistent with the observed increase in earnings.
From a theoretical viewpoint, the main implication of these differences in earnings and employment is that the share of small and middle-sized families that are on welfare and constrained by the 100-hour is negligible. In contrast, there is a significant portion of large families that are on welfare and constrained by the rule: their primary-earners would increase their employment and earnings in the absence of the rule (see Figure 1 , arrow A). Small and middle-sized families are mostly affected by an "eligibility" effect, whereas large families are mostly impacted by a "work incentive" effect.
Why do we observe such differences between large and small families in the effect of waiving the 100-hour rule? One possible explanation is that large families on welfare are even more "needy" than small and middle-sized families and more likely to find a small increase in total income worth a relatively large increase in work effort. Put differently, the increase in needs across family size would be more important than the increase in maximum benefits.
Total earned income, AFDC grants and total income
Tables 4, 5 and 6 present a statistical analysis for the difference in the distribution of total earned income, total income and AFDC grants between the control and the experiment groups, by family size. Tables 4 and 5 shows that, among small and middle-sized families, total earned income is, on average, higher in families in the control group than in families in the experiment group while total income is actually higher in the experiment group than in the control group (about 4% higher). Such variations are consistent with the "eligibility effect" described in previous subsection. These differences are not statistically significant, however, with the exception of significant difference in the distribution of total earned income (KS test) among middle-sized families, in Year 1 (Table 4) 16 .
Comparison between
These findings confirm our interpretation for the differences in welfare participation across the experiment and control groups for small and middle sized families. These differences are mostly due to the fact that some families exit unemployment, but have such low earnings that their incomes remain below the AFDC eligibility threshold. In the absence of the unemployment restriction, these families remain on aid and work possibly less than they would have worked if they have been obliged to exit welfare.
Concerning large families, Table 4 confirms that earned income is on average much higher in the experiment group than in the control group (+50%). But earnings represent such a low share of large families' income, that these differences in earnings do not translate into significant differences in total income 17 (+3%, see Table 5 ). Table 6 shows that AFDC grants for large families are higher in the control group than in the experiment group, confirming that a significant proportion of large families respond to a waiver of the rule by substituting welfare for work. The fact that these differences are statistically significant only in year 1 plausibly reflects the short-run nature of the work incentive effect of the waiver. In the longrun, most families exit unemployment and the only possible remaining effect is an eligibility effect.
Comparison of pre and post-experiment outcomes
16 These differences reflect the behavioral shift of only about 10% of the small and middle-sized families (as shown by the analysis of welfare participation). For this subset of families, the impact on mean earned income and mean total income may have been much more substantial (i.e., .04/.10=40%). 17 Given that these differences reflect the behavioral shift of only about 15% of the large families, we should again emphasize that the income impact may have been greater for these specific families (i.e. .03/.15=+20%).
We conducted supplementary statistical analyses using information on earned income prior to the experiment (Table 7) . We do not present this analysis by family size, because the size of the sub-samples would become so small that the different effects would be statistically insignificant.
These analyses reveal that the differences in welfare participation between the experiment and control groups are concentrated among families with some earned income prior to the experiment.
To interpret these findings and test whether they are consistent with our theoretical framework, we need to make some supplementary assumptions about the dynamics of the exogenous determinants of families' behaviors (i.e., the dynamics of their preferences, potential wages or unearned incomes). For simplicity, let us assume that these exogenous dynamics were the same before and after entry into the experiment. Under this assumption, families with zero earned income during the two years before their entry into the project are also families whose constrained behaviors should imply zero earned income after their entry into the project. Within this framework, the absence of differences in welfare participation between the experiment and control groups among families with zero earned income prior entry is consistent with our theoretical framework according to which differences in participation should only be observed for families whose primary-earners are employed.
Also, the comparison between pre and post-experiment outcomes confirm that there are no statistically significant differences in earned income across families in the experiment and control groups, regardless of whether we focus on families with relatively high or relatively low earned income prior to the experiment.
Discussion
Our basic research question was the following: what is the work-disincentive effect of providing assistance to two-parent families when the principal earner is unemployed and denying it when s/he is employed?
Our randomized experiment provides some interesting insights into the answer. First, it reveals that the work disincentive effects of the unemployment restriction are limited. Some large families seem to be constrained by the 100-hour rule and would increase employment and earnings if the rule were waived. This subset of large families represents a very small proportion of the total population on welfare, and the overall impact on work effort is therefore negligible. The first-order effect of waiving the unemployment restriction is not to increase work effort, but to increase welfare participation. A significant share of families are employed, but have such low wages that their income remains below the AFDC eligibility threshold. In the absence of the unemployment restriction, these families remain on welfare, increasing the welfare caseload. Furthermore, these working-poor families have the same labor market behavior, regardless of whether they can remain on welfare. These findings have policy and methodological implications. From a policy viewpoint, our findings shed light on the potential effects of recent welfare reform initiatives that suppress the unemployment requirement for welfare. Concerning families on welfare, our data show that the waiver of the unemployment restriction does not significantly increase their work effort, but does no doubt increase their welfare participation. In other words, the potential effect of the recent reform is not a decrease in the persistence of unemployment, but an increase in the persistence in welfare participation and in the welfare caseload.
Our data do not provide direct evidence on the effects of the reform on poor families not on welfare. One potential effect is that some of these families will find it optimal to begin to participate in welfare and (eventually) reduce their work effort. We do not have direct measurement for these long-term "entry" effects, mainly because unemployment according to the 100-hour rule is still required for initial eligibility onto welfare 18 . However, it seems clear that these effects do not imply an increase in unemployment. These effects should not even imply an increase in the share of primary earners working less than 100 hours: if it is optimal to begin to work less than 100 hours after the reform, it would also have been optimal (and possible) to do so in the absence of reform. In other words, the potential long-run "entry" effects go in the same direction as the effects that are measured by our randomized experiment: an increase in welfare participation, but no actual increase in unemployment (Figure 1, arrow B) . Our experiment provides a lower-bound for the actual (positive) impact of recent reforms on welfare participation and a correct estimation of the (negligible) impact of these reforms on unemployment rates. All in all, we would advise the waiver of the unemployment requirement not because this waiver would diminish unemployment without increasing welfare caseload, but because this waiver would make it possible to increase assistance to children in low-income (working) families without increasing unemployment.
From a more methodological viewpoint, these findings raise two questions: 1) Why do we not observe the increase in work effort expected by policy-makers? 2) Why do simulations from survey data yield different predictions than our findings from experimental data?
In her benchmark evaluation, Hoynes (1996) simulates that the elimination of the 100-hour rule would lead to about 4% increase in welfare participation while our results show a 30% increase two years after the waiver. Concerning families on welfare, Hoynes finds that eliminating the restriction leads to a very strong increase in the principal earners' employment rate (+37%) and average number of hours (+129%). We find such a strong effect for large families only (15% of the sample). In contrast, the effects on labor market outcomes are slightly negative for middle sized families (some substitute work for welfare) and negligible for small families. The overall effect is negligible.
One possible reason for the differences between our results and Hoynes' findings is that she uses a nationally representative survey while we use a sample of individuals from Central
Valley counties in California 19 .
Given that California is relatively generous in terms of AFDC benefits and that central valley counties are characterized by high rates of unemployment and poverty, it seems plausible to argue that our experiment takes place in an environment where the employment (welfare) effects were likely to be smaller (larger) than these effects nationwide. A related issue is that studies that rely on survey data make potentially optimistic assumptions about potential wages and employment opportunities of unemployed parents in low-income families. One basic and well-known problem with studies on work-incentives that rely on survey data is that they have to infer the distribution of (unobserved) potential wages of the unemployed from the distribution of the actual wages of the employed. This raises important problems of identification. One standard identifying assumption is that the number of children in the family explains unemployment, but does not explain wages. For instance, this is the assumption used by Hoynes (1996) to simulate the distribution of potential wages across unemployed welfare recipients. Once this assumption is wrong, the estimated distribution for potential wages is biased and the estimated impact for welfare transfers is not correct.
A more subtle issue is that correct simulations also require knowledge of the links between preferences and potential wages. It is not only the distribution of potential wages per se which is important in making good simulations, but the joint distribution of wages and preference parameters. The outcomes for a modification of the welfare system depend crucially on the level of potential wages, and on whether low-wage persons are those with relatively weak preference for hours of work or persons with relatively strong preferences for hours of work.
In general, the more negatively correlated potential wages and preference for hours of work, the less likely unemployed persons are to increase their work effort in response to a waiver of an unemployment requirement 20 .
Our results show that the impact of the waiver on work effort is much more pronounced for large families than for small and middle-sized families, in spite of larger AFDC benefits. One explanation is that the increase in needs across family size is more important than the increase in benefits and that large families are actually more likely to find a small increase of income worth a large increase in work effort.
Summary and conclusions
Combining welfare with work is a central concern of policy makers in welfare-reform initiatives today. The U.S. (and the U.K.) are at the forefront of introducing reforms designed to encourage work-effort and diminish the welfare caseload, and similar reforms in welfare programs have been implemented in continental Europe as well. Even France, that has always had a different conception of public assistance than the U.S. and the U.K., has recently developed programs encouraging work while on welfare.
Why are these «welfare-to-work» proposals becoming so universal? Perhaps this reflects the growing economic and ideological influence of the U.S. in the Western world. Another reason may be that the recent literature on labor supply has provided new empirical grounding to the belief that assisting poor and jobless families generates work-disincentive effects that favor welfare dependency and persisting unemployment and poverty.
However, our experimental data cast doubt on this belief. As far as Californian low-income population is concerned, the vast majority of welfare families are jobless because they are unable to match (perhaps temporarily, perhaps permanently) the labor market minimum standards, not because they lack an incentive to work. Within this context, the new welfare reform initiatives combining welfare with work implemented worldwide correspond to a 20 In their analysis of multiple program participation for single-parent families, Keane and Moffitt (1998) estimate jointly the wage equation and the labor supply-participation model, using simulated maximum likelihood method. Under residuals normality assumption, they find some significant negative correlation between the unobserved determinant of wages and of disutility of welfare participation. The extent to which we can infer to our analysis from the literature on single-parents is limited because single parents (usually mothers) differ substantially from principal earners in two-parent families (usually fathers) in their constraints on work hours and work history.
Data Appendix
The Center for Child and Family Policy Studies at the University of California, Los Angeles, evaluated LINK-UP under a contract from the California Department of Social Services (CDSS). Two official reports were produced (Hasenfeld et al 1995, and Hasenfeld et al 1996) which give rise to one publication (Lewin, 2001 ).
For each family of the LINK-UP sample, we have information from three basic data sources:
County Administrative Data; California Employment Development Department (EDD) data, including Unemployment Insurance and Disability Insurance (UI/DI) and Medi-Cal Eligibility Data System (MEDS) data.
(1) County Administrative Data:
The counties provide personal identifiers and information on the assignment of households to the LINK-UP control and experiment group as well as monthly information on AFDC grant amount.
(2) Employment Development Department data (EDD):
Employers report the wages of all employees covered by UI (Unemployment Insurance) or DI (Disability Insurance) to the California Employment Development Department on a quarterly basis 21 . These data provide information on earnings during the link-up experiment as well as earnings history, two years prior to the experiment.
(3) Medi-Cal Eligibility Data System (MEDS):
The state of California administers the Medi-Cal Eligibility Data System, which is a longitudinal database of Medi-Cal recipients. AFDC recipients are automatically eligible for Medi-Cal, hence, the MEDS records include information on all AFDC recipients. These files were used as a source for demographic information on LINK-UP participants, as well as for details on monthly participation in welfare programs and annual AFDC history dating back to 1987.
21 EDD contain employer reported taxable wage payments of UI and DI covered employment. Usually this includes employees paid more than $100 in a quarter, and domestic workers paid cash wages more than $750 a quarter. Certain types of workers are exempt from UI/DI coverage, and therefore their earnings are not reported in the EDD data. These are 1) self employed who chose not to be covered by UI/DI, 2) federal employees (military or civilian), 3) non-profit organization employees, 4) railroad employees, 5) students working for a school, college or university and, 6) casual labor paid less than $50 in a calendar quarter and working less than 24 days in that or the preceding quarter.
By design, the only difference between the experiment and control groups, on average, is waiving the 100-hour rule. Lewin (2001) provides basic statistics that confirm that there are no significant differences in the demographic or ethnic composition of control and experiment groups, nor in employment and welfare histories. Reading: In the control group, 87% of the families were still on welfare one quarter after their entry in the linkup project (Q1) and 37% were on welfare two years after their entry in the linkup project (Q8). * p < .05 the difference between the percent of families on welfare in the control and experiment group is statistically significant at the .05 level. Reading: In the control group, 33% of the principal earners were employed one quarter after their entry in the linkup project (Q1) and 34% were employed two years after their entry in the linkup project (Q8). Data (1992 Data ( -1994 Reading: Let us consider families with no earned income during the two years before their entry into the linkup project. During the two years following their entry, the principal earner earned on average 1482 dollars within the control group and 1533 dollars within the experiment group and the difference is not significantly different from zero. 
